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ABSTRACT:	  A	  perennial	  problem	  for	  fiscal	  governance	  in	  the	  euro	  area	  has	  been	  the	  lack	  of	  
support	   from	   markets.	   Far	   from	   disciplining	   budgetary	   policies,	   capital	   flows	   financed	  
deficits	  at	  historically	  low	  interest	  rates	  even	  when	  they	  broke	  EU	  fiscal	  rules.	  Theory	  would	  
lead	   us	   to	   expect	   that	   the	   international-­‐commercial	   and	   the	   supranational-­‐technocratic	  
assessments	  of	   sovereign	  debt	  are	   fairly	  aligned.	   	  But	   they	  were	  not.	  We	  show	  that	  credit	  
rating	   agencies	   (CRAs)	   and	   Eurostat	   have	   rather	   different	   assessments	   of	   what	   certain	  
policies	   mean	   for	   sovereign	   debt:	   the	   privatization	   of	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises,	   pension	  
reforms	   and	   more	   recently	   bank	   rescue	   programs.	   These	   assessments	   reveal	   divergent	  
approaches.	   Private	   agencies	   are	  prone	   to	   conformism	  and	  herding	  behavior,	   allowing	   for	  
little	   consistent	   discipline,	   while	   the	   public	   agency	   follows	   a	   bureaucratic	   imperative	   of	  
accountability	   and	   transparency,	   which	   gets	   in	   the	   way	   of	   evolving	   policy	   priorities.	   Our	  
findings	  thus	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  difficulties	  of	  fiscal	  governance	  by	  regulation	  only.	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EU	  Fiscal	  Governance	  and	  the	  Lack	  of	  Support	  by	  Market	  Discipline	  
A	  perennial	  problem	  for	  fiscal	  governance	  in	  the	  euro	  area	  has	  been	  the	  lack	  of	  support	  from	  
markets.	  Far	  from	  disciplining	  budgetary	  policies,	  capital	  flows	  financed	  deficits	  at	  
historically	  low	  interest	  rates	  (Manganelli	  and	  Wolswijk	  2007).	  They	  did	  so	  even	  when	  these	  
deficits	  broke	  EU	  fiscal	  rules	  that	  were	  meant	  to	  signal	  to	  markets	  that	  budgetary	  
developments	  were	  unsustainable.	  Some	  economists	  warned	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  market	  discipline	  
(Fitoussi	  2005,	  Faini	  2006).	  It	  is	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  EU’s	  fiscal	  rules	  could	  have	  been	  
more	  easily	  enforced	  if	  financial	  market	  actors	  had	  supported	  the	  Commission’s	  fiscal	  
surveillance:	  for	  instance	  if	  rating	  agencies	  downgraded	  the	  bonds	  of	  offending	  member	  
states	  reliably	  and	  investors	  imposed	  continually	  rising	  risk	  premia	  accordingly.	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  support	  for	  EU	  surveillance	  from	  rating	  agencies	  should	  come	  as	  a	  
surprise	  even	  to	  those	  who	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  efficiency	  is	  an	  inherent	  feature	  of	  financial	  
markets.	  After	  all,	  sovereign	  credit	  rating	  is	  a	  multi-­‐billion	  dollar	  business,	  dominated	  by	  
three	  agencies	  (Fitch,	  Moody’s,	  and	  Standard	  &Poor’s)	  that	  constantly	  provide	  information	  
to	  markets	  about	  the	  credit	  risk	  of	  government	  bond	  issues.	  By	  mid-­‐2010,	  Standard	  &	  Poor’s	  
(S&P)	  rated	  125	  governments,	  the	  other	  two	  over	  a	  100	  each	  (IMF	  2010:	  87).	  This	  makes	  
reputation	  for	  accurate	  ratings	  extremely	  valuable.	  Moreover,	  there	  should	  also	  have	  been	  
monitoring	  of	  these	  monitors.	  Credit	  ratings	  were	  built	  into	  the	  regulation	  of	  financial	  
institutions,	  in	  that	  the	  risk-­‐weights	  of	  the	  assets	  could	  be	  based	  on	  such	  credit	  ratings	  and	  
thus	  determine	  the	  capital	  requirements	  under	  Basel	  II	  (IMF2010:	  91-­‐92).	  Since	  government	  
bonds	  of	  OECD	  countries	  carried	  a	  zero	  risk	  weight	  and	  were	  therefore	  very	  attractive	  to	  
meet	  capital	  requirements,	  it	  should	  at	  the	  same	  time	  have	  given	  independent	  financial	  
regulators	  considerable	  incentive	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  ratings	  of	  government	  bonds	  
signaled	  problems	  of	  fiscal	  sustainability	  accurately.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  the	  European	  Central	  
Bank	  (ECB),	  like	  other	  central	  banks,	  used	  these	  credit	  ratings	  in	  refinancing	  operations:	  in	  
return	  for	  central	  bank	  credit,	  banks	  had	  to	  put	  up	  collateral	  that	  must	  meet	  a	  certain	  credit	  
rating	  standard	  in	  order	  to	  be	  acceptable	  to	  the	  ECB.	  In	  sum,	  both	  financial	  and	  institutional	  
incentives	  for	  reputation	  of	  commercial	  and	  technocratic	  monitors	  of	  public	  finances	  should	  
have	  been	  aligned.	  	  	  
These	  considerations,	  and	  the	  puzzle	  they	  entail,	  can	  be	  supported	  by	  at	  least	  two	  
conceptualizations	  of	  the	  European	  integration	  project.	  There	  is,	  first,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
the	  EU	  as	  a	  regulatory	  polity	  that	  suggests	  that	  it	  constitutes	  a	  ‘fourth	  branch	  of	  
government’	  for	  supranational	  economic	  regulation	  (Majone	  1993,	  1996).	  This	  theory	  seeks	  
to	  explain	  why	  sovereign	  governments	  delegated	  considerable	  regulatory	  powers	  to	  
independent	  bodies,	  such	  as	  the	  Commission	  or	  the	  ECB.	  In	  this	  view,	  delegation	  of	  
policymaking	  powers	  guards	  against	  well-­‐known	  failures	  of	  democracy	  to	  either	  represent	  
the	  majority	  or	  to	  consider	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  outsiders	  of	  national	  democratic	  
processes,	  be	  it	  foreigners	  or	  future	  generations.	  In	  the	  medium	  to	  long	  run,	  these	  failures	  
impoverish	  countries	  and	  the	  interdependence	  of	  economies	  makes	  national	  democratic	  
failure	  a	  problem	  for	  other	  countries.	  Hence,	  governments	  agree	  on	  supranational	  
institutions	  that	  mutually	  commit	  them	  to	  non-­‐discrimination	  of	  foreign	  suppliers	  and	  
migrant	  workers	  as	  well	  as	  restraint	  on	  destabilizing	  macroeconomic	  policies.	  Hence,	  the	  
values	  that	  underpin	  a	  functioning	  market	  economy	  and	  efficiency-­‐oriented	  supranational	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regulation	  appear	  to	  be	  perfectly	  compatible	  and	  in	  the	  long-­‐run	  interest	  of	  national	  
democracies.1	  
At	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  this	  functionalist	  view	  of	  EU	  policymaking	  is	  a	  constructivist	  
interpretation	  that	  sees	  European	  economic	  integration	  as	  putting	  into	  practice	  neo-­‐	  or	  
ordoliberal	  ideas.	  This	  followed	  the	  perceived	  German	  success	  story	  at	  a	  time	  when	  
Keynesian	  interventions	  seemed	  to	  fail	  (McNamara	  1998).	  A	  singularly	  independent	  central	  
bank	  and	  fiscal	  rules	  were	  introduced	  to	  tie	  governments’	  hands.	  The	  recent	  failure	  of	  
financial	  markets	  on	  a	  colossal	  scale	  did	  not	  end	  the	  neoliberal	  reign,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  an	  
‘austerity	  delusion’	  has	  taken	  hold	  of	  EU	  policymakers	  that	  is	  manifestly	  counterproductive	  
for	  economic	  recovery	  (Blyth	  2013:	  ch.3).	  In	  this	  view,	  the	  fiscal	  surveillance	  process	  can	  be	  
seen	  as	  directly	  feeding	  financial	  investors	  with	  data,	  inviting	  them	  to	  sanction	  government	  
behavior	  that	  would	  prioritize	  domestic	  redistribution	  and	  stimulus	  over	  the	  repayment	  of	  
bonds.	  The	  role	  of	  credit	  ratings	  in	  the	  Basel	  II	  framework	  of	  financial	  regulation	  is	  further	  
evidence	  for	  a	  close	  alignment	  of	  business	  interests	  and	  neoliberal	  ideas	  of	  government.	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  solve	  the	  puzzle	  why	  EU	  fiscal	  governance	  is	  not	  more	  supported	  by	  bond	  
market	  discipline,	  we	  exploit	  the	  empirical	  corollary	  of	  these	  theories:	  both	  imply	  that	  the	  
international-­‐commercial	  assessments	  of	  sovereign	  creditworthiness	  and	  the	  supranational-­‐
technocratic	  surveillance	  of	  budgets	  should	  be	  fairly	  aligned.	  Prospective	  bond	  buyers	  had	  in	  
the	  Commission	  a	  potential	  ally	  and	  the	  regulatory/	  neoliberal	  polity	  in	  fiscal	  policy	  should	  
have	  directly	  fed	  into	  the	  assessment	  of	  sovereign	  creditworthiness	  by	  rating	  agencies.	  The	  
commercial	  agencies’	  interest	  in	  the	  probability	  of	  sovereign	  default	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  
specification	  of	  the	  EU’s	  interest	  in	  externalities	  of	  public	  debt	  accumulation,	  such	  as	  higher	  
interest	  rates	  and	  inflationary	  pressures.	  	  
For	  our	  study	  of	  rating	  agency	  behavior,	  we	  concentrate	  on	  Standard	  and	  Poor’s,	  
which	  is	  the	  most	  active	  and	  influential	  agency	  in	  sovereign	  credit	  rating	  (de	  Haan	  and	  
Amtenbrink	  2011:	  5,	  9).	  We	  analyze	  the	  content	  of	  Rating	  Methodologies	  and	  individual	  
rating	  reports	  for	  individual	  countries	  issued	  by	  S&P.2	  For	  the	  study	  of	  technocratic	  fiscal	  
surveillance,	  we	  analyze	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Eurostat’s	  statistical	  accounting	  translates	  data	  
on	  pension	  savings,	  privatization	  and	  banking	  rescues	  into	  information	  about	  fiscal	  
sustainability.	  So	  we	  turn	  the	  theoretical	  puzzle	  into	  the	  empirically	  researchable	  question:	  
why	  do	  market	  actors	  and	  a	  supranational	  economic	  bureaucracy	  have	  different	  
assessments	  of	  three	  government	  interventions?	  
We	  have	  chosen	  pension	  reforms,	  the	  privatization	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises,	  and	  
bank	  rescue	  programs	  because	  they	  have	  strong	  fiscal	  consequences	  in	  contrast	  to,	  for	  
instance,	  cuts	  in	  unemployment	  benefits.	  They	  also	  have	  sufficiently	  rich	  and	  complex	  
budgetary	  effects	  so	  that	  their	  assessment	  is	  a	  non-­‐trivial	  task.	  Their	  long-­‐term	  effects	  can	  
be	  different	  from	  the	  short-­‐term,	  so	  they	  can	  reduce	  or	  increase	  the	  deficit.	  Finally,	  despite	  
their	  similarities,	  these	  policy	  areas	  are	  of	  different	  interest	  to	  private	  and	  public	  bodies:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Majone	  envisaged	  a	  narrow	  mandate	  for	  the	  EU,	  such	  as	  free	  trade	  in	  the	  Single	  market	  and	  stability-­‐oriented	  
monetary	  policy	  by	  an	  independent	  ECB.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  regulatory	  polity	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  politically	  more	  
conflictual	  than	  Majone’s	  functional	  assignment	  suggests	  and	  by	  resolving	  these	  conflicts,	  it	  encroaches	  on	  core	  
state	  powers	  (Mabbett	  and	  Schelkle	  2009,	  Genschel	  and	  Jachtenfuchs	  2013).	  
2	  The	  evidence	  is	  based	  on	  267	  country	  reports	  between	  1999	  and	  2012.	  Reports	  specifically	  referenced	  in	  this	  
text	  are	  specified	  by	  country	  acronym	  and	  publication	  date.	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privatization	  is	  a	  policy	  of	  intense	  interest	  to	  private	  investors	  while	  pensions	  are	  of	  more	  
remote	  relevance;	  both	  are	  equally	  important	  policy	  issues	  for	  public	  agencies.	  Bank	  rescues	  
are	  a	  casualty,	  not	  on	  anybody’s	  policy	  agenda.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  how	  commercial	  and	  
technocratic	  monitoring	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  interpret	  complex	  data	  and	  turn	  it	  into	  
information	  about	  fiscal	  sustainability	  or	  sovereign	  creditworthiness,	  respectively.	  	  
The	  next	  four	  sections	  analyze	  the	  rating	  and	  statistical	  accounting	  of	  the	  three	  
policy	  measures	  as	  well	  as	  recent	  changes	  to	  the	  approach	  of	  CRAs	  and	  to	  fiscal	  surveillance	  
in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  crisis.	  In	  the	  last	  section,	  we	  discuss	  our	  findings	  
and	  we	  try	  to	  answer	  the	  overall	  question	  of	  why	  EU	  fiscal	  governance	  by	  regulation	  only	  is	  
so	  unsatisfactory,	  both	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  those	  who	  are	  concerned	  about	  high	  debt	  
and	  those	  who	  are	  concerned	  about	  constraints	  on	  fiscal	  stimulus.	  	  
	  
Privatization	  of	  public	  assets	  
The	  privatization	  of	  public	  enterprises	  was	  arguably	  part	  of	  the	  EU	  agenda	  in	  creating	  the	  
Single	  Market,	  for	  instance	  in	  public	  utilities.	  Privatization	  was	  seen	  as	  supporting	  
integration	  by	  removing	  market	  segmentation	  and	  protective	  barriers	  (Sauter	  and	  Schepel	  
2009:	  4-­‐5).	  Fiscal	  surveillance	  may	  not	  be	  entirely	  supportive	  of	  this	  thrust	  because	  
privatization	  can	  entail	  a	  loss	  of	  assets	  and	  revenue-­‐generating	  capacity	  of	  public	  finances.	  
The	  international	  accounting	  rules,	  which	  Eurostat	  has	  helped	  to	  design,	  are	  of	  special	  
importance	  as	  they	  may	  encourage	  or	  discourage	  privatization	  of	  public	  enterprises	  
depending	  on	  what	  selling	  public	  assets	  means	  for	  headline	  fiscal	  figures.	  
These	  rules	  had	  special	  significance	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  euro.	  In	  the	  
Maastricht	  process,	  member	  states	  tried	  to	  meet	  the	  fiscal	  criteria	  for	  entry,	  the	  notorious	  3	  
per	  cent	  deficit-­‐to-­‐GDP	  and	  the	  60	  per	  cent	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio,	  by	  selling	  public	  enterprises	  
(Savage	  2005:	  25).	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  generate	  deficit-­‐reducing	  revenue	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
indebted	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises,	  to	  reduce	  debt.	  The	  latter	  is	  possible	  insofar	  the	  
Maastricht	  criterion	  on	  debt	  is	  a	  gross	  concept,	  i.e.	  it	  is	  not	  netted	  against	  assets.	  	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  the	  fiscal	  criteria	  measure	  only	  the	  deficit	  and	  debt	  of	  general	  government,	  
which	  excludes	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  if	  they	  are	  in	  principle	  
commercial	  undertakings,	  producing	  for	  markets	  and	  selling	  in	  markets.	  	  
Eurostat	  developed	  the	  following	  principle	  regarding	  the	  question	  whether	  a	  
country	  can	  use	  privatizations	  to	  meet	  the	  fiscal	  Maastricht	  criteria	  or	  not	  (Savage	  2005:	  81-­‐
89):	  only	  the	  direct	  sale	  of	  non-­‐financial	  assets	  like	  building,	  land	  and	  inventories	  reduces	  
the	  deficit.	  This	  transaction	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  asset	  side,	  as	  it	  is	  normally	  just	  seen	  as	  a	  
change	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  asset	  holdings,	  say	  from	  equity	  to	  cash.	  By	  contrast,	  selling	  
financial	  assets,	  such	  as	  a	  financial	  stake	  in	  a	  state-­‐owned	  enterprise,	  will	  not	  affect	  the	  
budget	  balance	  of	  the	  government	  as	  the	  revenues	  from	  the	  sale	  are	  matched	  by	  the	  loss	  of	  
revenues	  from	  holding	  these	  financial	  assets	  (e.g.	  dividends).	  Savage	  (2005:	  88)	  notes	  that	  
the	  European	  System	  of	  Accounts	  ‘produces	  an	  interesting	  disincentive	  for	  privatizing	  public	  
enterprises	  for	  purposes	  of	  deficit	  reduction,	  but	  a	  counterpart	  incentive	  for	  purposes	  of	  
debt	  reduction’.	  The	  latter	  is	  the	  case	  because	  selling	  non-­‐financial	  assets	  is	  not	  counted	  as	  a	  
loss	  of	  revenue-­‐generating	  assets	  and	  the	  proceeds	  can	  be	  used	  to	  reduce	  debt.	  
A	  live	  issue	  then	  and	  now	  is	  the	  ‘cleaning	  out’	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  before	  
privatization	  (Eurostat	  2013:	  142),	  namely	  to	  assume	  debt	  or	  obligations	  that	  could	  scare	  off	  
prospective	  investors.	  The	  clean-­‐out	  typically	  requires	  a	  one-­‐off	  payment	  from	  the	  company	  
	   5	  
as	  compensation	  for	  the	  government	  taking	  over	  all	  or	  part	  of	  the	  liabilities,	  notably	  
pensions	  for	  the	  employees.	  This	  could	  be	  timed	  such	  that	  it	  helps	  the	  government	  to	  
enhance	  its	  budget	  balance	  at	  a	  convenient	  moment.	  Eurostat	  (2013:	  142-­‐143)	  accepts	  the	  
lump	  sum	  payment	  to	  the	  government	  as	  deficit-­‐decreasing	  revenue.	  This	  revenue	  will	  be	  
offset	  by	  future	  payments	  of	  pensions	  that	  increase	  the	  deficit.	  However,	  if	  the	  lump-­‐sum	  or	  
one-­‐off	  payment	  does	  not	  match	  the	  actuarial	  value	  of	  the	  obligations,	  the	  difference	  must	  
be	  recorded	  as	  a	  deficit-­‐increasing	  capital	  transfer	  if	  the	  lump	  sum	  is	  too	  low	  while	  it	  must	  
be	  recorded	  as	  a	  deficit-­‐neutral	  ‘withdrawal	  of	  equity’	  (switch	  of	  public	  asset	  composition)	  if	  
it	  is	  too	  high	  (Eurostat	  2013:	  143).	  This	  asymmetry	  means	  that	  the	  accounting	  rule	  penalizes	  
debt	  assumption	  by	  government	  but	  does	  not	  reward	  implicit	  taxation	  of	  investors	  in	  
privatization.	  	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  (in-­‐)famous	  instance	  of	  statistical	  case	  law,	  namely	  France	  
Telecom	  (1996),	  concerned	  exactly	  such	  an	  exercise	  of	  assuming	  unfunded	  pension	  
obligations	  in	  return	  for	  a	  payment	  by	  the	  corporation,	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  0.5%	  of	  GDP	  that	  the	  
French	  Treasury	  was	  to	  receive.3	  A	  very	  public	  battle	  between	  the	  European	  statisticians	  and	  
the	  French	  Treasury	  ensued.	  The	  former	  argued	  that	  the	  payment	  did	  not	  come	  with	  
contributions	  from	  the	  employees,	  hence	  must	  be	  counted	  as	  a	  deficit-­‐increasing	  capital	  
transfer,	  while	  the	  French	  authorities	  claimed	  that	  it	  must	  be	  counted	  as	  revenue.	  The	  
revenue	  would	  get	  the	  country	  some	  way	  towards	  meeting	  the	  Maastricht	  deficit	  threshold,	  
given	  a	  deficit	  of	  4.1%	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  aggressive	  handling	  of	  the	  case	  by	  Eurostat,	  
interestingly	  under	  its	  then	  French	  chairman,	  made	  it	  ultimately	  lose	  this	  battle	  against	  the	  
French	  Treasury.	  
Unsurprisingly,	  S&P	  ratings	  view	  privatization	  very	  positively.	  Commercial	  investors	  
are	  profoundly	  interested	  in	  the	  investment	  opportunities	  that	  privatizations	  create	  and	  
they	  are	  major	  clients	  of	  CRAs.	  Even	  in	  specific	  cases,	  S&P	  did	  not	  take	  into	  account	  that	  
governments	  may	  lose	  revenue	  by	  disposing	  of	  public	  assets	  and	  thus	  impair	  their	  future	  
creditworthiness.	  In	  successive	  methodologies,	  S&P	  expresses	  its	  reservations	  against	  large	  
public	  sectors.	  First,	  a	  large	  public	  sector	  decreases	  a	  country’s	  policy	  flexibility,	  because	  
sizeable	  public	  employment	  generates	  a	  fixed	  commitment	  of	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  
government	  resources.	  Second,	  a	  large	  public	  sector	  is	  deemed	  to	  limit	  a	  country’s	  growth	  
potential;	  the	  epithet	  ‘inefficient’	  invariably	  accompanies	  any	  mention	  of	  a	  ‘large	  public	  
sector’.	  Third,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  raises	  
suspicion	  about	  the	  off-­‐balance	  sheet	  liabilities	  that	  a	  government	  might	  need	  to	  deal	  with	  
in	  the	  future	  and	  thus	  creates	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  country’s	  true	  fiscal	  position.	  Therefore,	  
privatization	  can	  be	  unambiguously	  expected	  to	  give	  a	  boost	  to	  ratings	  through	  both	  the	  
fiscal	  score	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  increasing	  policy	  flexibility	  and	  improving	  transparency	  of	  the	  real	  
fiscal	  situation	  –	  and	  on	  the	  economic	  score	  by	  improving	  growth	  prospects.	  None	  of	  the	  
methodologies	  mention	  how	  the	  loss	  of	  assets	  or	  the	  loss	  of	  future	  revenue	  producing	  
capacities	  could	  affect	  the	  fiscal	  position	  of	  the	  country	  or,	  indeed,	  take	  into	  consideration	  
the	  intricacies	  of	  needing	  to	  ‘clean-­‐out’	  public	  enterprises	  of	  liabilities	  before	  their	  sale.	  It	  is	  
especially	  noteworthy	  that	  S&P	  does	  not	  mention	  new	  liabilities	  taken	  on	  by	  the	  state	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  France	  Telecom	  case	  can	  be	  revisited	  in	  the	  surprisingly	  gripping	  account	  of	  Savage	  (2005:	  110-­‐121).	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course	  of	  privatization	  given	  that	  methodologies	  explicitly	  warn	  of	  liabilities	  hidden	  in	  
publicly	  owned	  enterprises	  (S&P	  2006:	  11).	  	  
The	  picture	  emerging	  from	  the	  country	  rating	  reports	  is	  less	  straightforward,	  
however.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  what	  extent	  privatizations	  influence	  the	  actual	  rating	  score.	  Rating	  
reports	  often	  criticize	  countries	  whose	  public	  sector	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  too	  large.	  They	  also	  
recommend	  privatization	  and	  praise	  the	  countries	  that	  undertake	  it,	  with	  the	  caveat	  that	  
one-­‐off	  improvement	  in	  deficit	  figures	  due	  to	  privatization	  should	  be	  treated	  with	  caution.	  
But	  none	  of	  this	  translates	  directly	  into	  actual	  ratings	  scores.	  Rating	  reports	  have	  repeatedly	  
warned	  Austria,	  Denmark	  and	  France	  that	  their	  governments	  are	  too	  large,	  yet	  all	  three	  
countries	  remained	  AAA-­‐rated	  before	  the	  crisis4.	  When	  Austria	  and	  France	  were	  
downgraded	  in	  January	  2012,	  the	  size	  of	  their	  public	  sectors	  was	  not	  mentioned	  as	  a	  reason	  
(S&P	  Au2012Jan13	  and	  Fr2012Jan13).	  France	  was	  subsequently	  downgraded	  again	  in	  
November	  2013	  for	  lack	  of	  structural	  reforms	  of	  labor	  markets,	  rather	  than	  too	  little	  
privatization	  (FT	  2013	  Nov).	  For	  lower-­‐rated	  governments,	  however,	  efforts	  to	  slim	  their	  
public	  sectors	  via	  privatization	  seem	  to	  matter.	  When	  they	  were	  upgraded	  in	  the	  1990s,	  
Greece,	  Italy	  and	  Portugal	  were	  commended	  for	  their	  structural	  reforms,	  including	  
privatizations,	  and	  when	  they	  were	  downgraded	  on	  several	  different	  occasions	  during	  the	  
2000s,	  lack	  of	  further	  structural	  reforms	  was	  quoted	  as	  one	  of	  the	  reasons5.	  It	  is	  difficult,	  
however,	  to	  separate	  out	  the	  independent	  effect	  of	  privatizations	  on	  the	  rating	  scores,	  
because	  these	  successive	  upgrades	  and	  downgrades	  coincided	  with	  improving	  and	  then	  
deteriorating	  trends	  in	  public	  finance.	  While	  S&P	  provides	  unambiguous	  support	  for	  
privatization	  in	  the	  qualitative	  analysis	  provided	  by	  its	  rating	  reports,	  it	  is	  unclear	  to	  what	  
extent	  it	  is	  willing	  to	  ‘enforce’	  such	  recommendations	  through	  the	  rating	  score	  it	  awards.	  
In	  sum,	  despite	  the	  general	  agreement	  between	  EU	  authorities	  and	  S&P	  about	  the	  
desirability	  of	  privatization	  at	  the	  level	  of	  principles,	  the	  tangible	  incentives	  that	  the	  
supranational	  and	  commercial	  channels	  of	  surveillance	  provide	  are	  quite	  different.	  European	  
statistical	  rules	  encourage	  privatization	  to	  reduce	  current	  debt	  but	  not	  deficit	  figures	  that	  
would	  allow	  governments	  to	  prettify	  their	  fiscal	  performance.	  They	  even	  allow	  the	  exchange	  
of	  current	  deficits	  for	  future	  deficits,	  in	  that	  present	  deficits	  can	  be	  reduced	  by	  payments	  
received	  from	  companies	  in	  return	  for	  liabilities	  being	  transferred	  to	  the	  state.	  But	  Eurostat	  
has	  also	  been	  at	  pains	  to	  ensure	  that	  some	  of	  the	  hidden	  losses	  entailed	  in	  the	  sale	  of	  
government	  assets	  are	  recorded	  transparently,	  albeit	  their	  efforts	  have	  not	  always	  been	  
successful	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  France	  Telecom	  case.	  S&P	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  did	  not	  
acknowledge	  costs	  of	  privatization.	  Issues	  like	  the	  assumption	  of	  implicit	  liabilities	  have	  
never	  been	  mentioned	  in	  either	  methodologies	  or	  in	  rating	  reports.	  Apart	  from	  the	  
occasional	  warning	  that	  one-­‐off	  measures	  to	  decrease	  the	  deficit	  should	  be	  greeted	  with	  
caution,	  the	  reports	  do	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  that	  privatization	  deals	  may	  be	  myopic	  
and	  reduce	  a	  country’s	  long-­‐term	  creditworthiness.	  That	  said,	  given	  the	  multitude	  of	  factors	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  S&P	  Au2000June13,	  Au2003May21,	  Au2004Apr15,	  Dk1999Apr28,	  Dk2001Feb27,	  Dk2007Sep26,	  Fr2001Jan24,	  
Fr2002Jan28,	  Fr2003Mar9,	  Fr2004Jan20,	  Fr2006Feb28,	  	  
5	  S&P	  Gr1999Nov24,	  Gr2001Mar13,	  Gr2002July3,	  Gr2003June10,	  Gr2004Sep13,	  Gr2005Nov8,	  Gr2007Mar6,	  
It1999May27,	  It2000Apr19,	  It2001Oct26,	  It2003Jan15,	  It2003Nov25,	  It2004July7,	  It2005Aug8,	  It2006Oct19,	  
It2007Oct23,	  Pt2000Apr5,	  Pt2001June21,	  Pt2002Oct31,	  Pt2004Oct29,	  Pt2005June27,	  Pt2006Mar29,	  
Pt2006Oct30,	  Pt2007Oct25	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that	  are	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  the	  rating	  process,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  identify	  the	  
tangible	  incentives	  that	  S&P	  provides	  for	  selling	  public	  enterprises.	  We	  conclude	  that	  
commercial	  and	  technocratic	  assessments	  are	  not	  aligned,	  despite	  overall	  support	  for	  
privatizations	  by	  both	  institutions.	  Fiscal	  surveillance	  effectively	  constrains	  privatization	  if	  it	  
suspects	  short-­‐termist	  deficit	  reduction.	  	  
	  
Pension	  Reforms	  
The	  increasing	  pension	  liabilities	  of	  governments	  have	  bothered	  EU	  fiscal	  
surveillance	  for	  some	  time.	  Member	  states	  must	  provide	  estimates	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  age-­‐
related	  contingent	  liabilities	  over	  a	  rolling	  50-­‐year	  horizon	  in	  their	  annual	  stability	  programs.	  
There	  are	  dedicated	  publications,	  such	  as	  the	  tri-­‐annual	  Ageing	  Reports	  and	  the	  Fiscal	  
Sustainability	  Reports,	  in	  which	  the	  European	  Commission	  regularly	  quantifies	  the	  effects	  of	  
ageing	  on	  the	  ratios	  of	  workers	  to	  pensioners,	  on	  government	  expenditure	  and	  on	  debt.6	  In	  
the	  country-­‐specific	  recommendations	  issued	  under	  the	  European	  Semester,	  the	  
Commission	  urges	  pension	  reform,	  notably	  increasing	  the	  retirement	  age,	  reducing	  public	  
pension	  entitlements	  and	  introducing	  mandatory	  personal	  pensions,	  in	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  
member	  states	  (SPC	  2008).	  	  
However,	  despite	  these	  revealed	  concerns	  about	  the	  demographic	  drivers	  of	  
sovereign	  debt,	  the	  statistical	  accounting	  for	  pensions	  has	  not	  managed	  to	  incorporate	  the	  
issue	  in	  a	  way	  that	  provides	  incentives	  for	  the	  recommended	  pension	  reforms.	  Eurostat	  is	  
quite	  explicit	  about	  the	  difficulties	  to	  account	  consistently	  for	  the	  various	  tiers	  or	  pillars	  of	  
old	  age	  security.	  The	  ‘Manual	  on	  Government	  Deficit	  and	  Debt’	  notes,	  with	  an	  undertone	  of	  
regret,	  that	  there	  is	  an	  inconsistency	  in	  the	  accounting	  between	  pension	  obligations	  from	  
funded	  and	  from	  unfunded	  schemes	  (Eurostat	  2013:	  144):	  while	  the	  obligations	  under	  the	  
former	  are	  counted	  as	  gross	  debt	  which	  is	  not	  offset	  by	  the	  assets,	  under	  the	  latter	  
obligations	  are	  not	  counted	  as	  debt	  and	  become	  visible	  only	  as	  they	  arise	  in	  future	  
expenditure.	  In	  this	  European	  accounting	  sense,	  the	  move	  to	  a	  funded	  public	  pension	  pillar	  
is	  therefore	  not	  made	  attractive	  for	  any	  administration	  currently	  in	  power.	  Another	  
consequence	  of	  these	  accounting	  rules	  is	  that	  pension	  liabilities	  can	  be	  made	  to	  disappear	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  privatizations	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises,	  namely	  by	  transferring	  them	  from	  a	  
funded	  occupational	  scheme	  to	  a	  public	  pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go	  scheme.	  Thus,	  rather	  than	  shifting	  
from	  public	  unfunded	  to	  private	  or	  collective	  funded	  schemes,	  there	  are	  incentives	  to	  move	  
in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  
Another	  issue	  concerns	  defined-­‐benefit	  schemes:	  public	  pensions	  typically	  promise	  a	  
certain	  level	  of	  benefits	  irrespective	  of	  the	  individual	  contributions.	  But	  given	  the	  
uncertainty	  of	  life	  expectancy,	  public	  pension	  schemes	  tend	  to	  be	  underfunded	  and	  so	  the	  
question	  arises	  how	  one	  can	  account	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  present	  value	  of	  promised	  benefits	  
exceeds	  the	  present	  value	  of	  actual	  contributions.	  	  The	  European	  statisticians	  rule	  that	  
government	  payments	  to	  restore	  the	  balance	  of	  a	  defined-­‐benefit	  scheme	  must	  be	  counted	  
as	  a	  deficit-­‐increasing	  transfer	  (Eurostat	  2013:	  20).	  Defined	  contribution	  schemes,	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  For	  fiscal	  surveillance,	  see	  the	  dedicated	  website	  of	  DG	  Ecfin	  at	  URL:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/structural_reforms/ageing/pensions/index_en.htm	  (accessed	  21	  
December	  2014).	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contrast,	  are	  never	  part	  of	  social	  security	  and	  thus	  general	  government	  in	  accounting	  terms	  
because	  individuals	  get	  only	  the	  benefits	  that	  match	  the	  value	  of	  their	  contributions.	  
Eurostat	  (2013:	  20)	  mentions,	  however,	  these	  schemes	  are	  sometimes	  also	  constructed	  with	  
redistributive	  elements	  (i.e.	  individual	  contributions	  do	  not	  match	  benefits	  ex	  ante)	  and	  thus	  
can	  lead	  to	  payments	  that	  should	  be	  relevant	  for	  the	  balance	  recorded	  under	  fiscal	  
surveillance,	  yet	  they	  are	  not.	  	  
The	  commercial	  rating	  of	  pension	  liabilities	  shows	  other	  signs	  of	  inconsistency.	  The	  
stance	  of	  S&P	  on	  pension	  reforms	  evolved	  in	  a	  curious	  fashion	  over	  time.	  In	  its	  rating	  
methodologies	  issued	  in	  2006	  and	  2008,	  S&P	  emphatically	  warned	  of	  the	  risks	  to	  fiscal	  
sustainability	  that	  ageing	  would	  bring	  and	  warned	  that	  sovereigns	  that	  fail	  to	  address	  age-­‐
related	  spending	  pressures	  might	  be	  downgraded	  in	  the	  medium	  term	  (S&P	  2006:	  10;	  S&P	  
2008).	  Country-­‐specific	  rating	  reports	  also	  repeatedly	  brought	  up	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  age-­‐
related	  spending	  increases.	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  France,	  Germany	  and	  Italy	  were	  frequently	  
urged	  to	  address	  their	  vulnerabilities	  in	  this	  regard7.	  In	  other	  countries,	  the	  absence	  of	  rising	  
pension	  liabilities	  was	  stressed	  as	  a	  factor	  that	  lead	  to	  stronger	  ratings.	  Favorable	  
demographics	  and	  prefunding	  were	  mentioned	  as	  important	  strengths	  in	  Ireland,	  a	  fully	  
funded	  and	  sizeable	  second	  tier	  propped	  up	  ratings	  for	  Denmark,	  whereas	  the	  UK	  was	  
commended	  for	  its	  largely	  private	  pension	  provision8.	  Since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  crisis,	  however,	  
S&P	  has	  put	  much	  less	  emphasis	  on	  pension	  reforms.	  Compared	  to	  the	  alarmist	  tone	  in	  
earlier	  methodologies,	  the	  revised	  methodologies	  issued	  in	  2011	  and	  2013	  explicitly	  
downplay	  the	  aging-­‐related	  risks	  to	  sovereign	  creditworthiness	  and	  emphasize	  that	  in	  many	  
cases	  there	  is	  still	  sufficient	  time	  to	  address	  these	  issues	  (S&P	  2011:	  26	  and	  S&P	  2013:	  26).	  In	  
line	  with	  this	  change	  of	  methodologies,	  the	  individual	  country	  reports	  have	  become	  mostly	  
oblivious	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  ageing	  and	  of	  pension	  reforms.	  
In	  sum,	  commercial	  rating	  and	  supranational	  surveillance	  go	  into	  opposite	  directions	  
as	  regards	  their	  assessment	  of	  reducing	  public	  pensions.	  Eurostat	  flags	  up	  the	  issue	  but	  
consistency	  of	  statistical	  rules	  prevents	  it	  from	  accounting	  for	  the	  contingent	  pension	  
liabilities	  in	  public	  budgets	  in	  the	  headline	  fiscal	  indicators,	  the	  debt-­‐	  and	  deficit-­‐to-­‐GDP	  
ratios.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  fiscal	  surveillance	  has	  found	  other	  venues,	  such	  as	  the	  European	  
Semester	  and	  the	  regular	  stability	  programs,	  to	  drive	  home	  the	  message.	  S&P	  issued	  
warnings	  that	  it	  would	  initiate	  downgrades	  if	  a	  government	  failed	  to	  deal	  with	  age-­‐related	  
expenditures	  but	  hardly	  ever	  acted	  on	  it.	  More	  recently,	  this	  CRA	  has	  backtracked	  on	  
pension	  reforms	  considerably.	  There	  is	  certainly	  no	  alignment	  in	  this	  policy	  area.	  	  
	  
Crisis	  Management:	  Economic	  Stabilization	  and	  Bank	  Rescues	  
The	  financial	  and	  economic	  crisis	  since	  2007-­‐08	  forced	  governments	  to	  temporarily	  set	  aside	  
fiscal	  rigor	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  prop	  up	  their	  ailing	  economies	  with	  stimulus	  measures.	  It	  also	  
pushed	  governments	  into	  bank	  rescues	  on	  a	  truly	  astounding	  scale,	  for	  fear	  that	  otherwise	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  S&P	  Au2000June13,	  Au2003May21,	  Be1999Feb1,	  Be2002Feb18,	  Be2003Mar18,	  Be2004Jan23,	  Fr2001Jan24,	  
Fr2002Jan28,	  Fr2003Mar19,	  Fr2004Jan20,	  Fr2006Feb28,	  Ge2002Dec10,	  Ge2003May6,	  Ge2005Mar1,	  
Ge2005Nov16,	  Ge2006Dec19,	  It1999May27,	  It2000Apr19,	  It2001Oct26,	  It2003Jan15,	  It2006Oct19	  
8	  S&P	  Dk2001Feb27,	  Dk2002Mar26,	  Dk2003Apr9,	  Dk2004Aug26,	  Dk2005Sep30,	  Dk2006Sep25,	  Dk2007Sep26,	  
Ir1999Aug13,	  Ir2000Oct3,	  Ir2001Oct3,	  Ir2002Sep5,	  Ir2003Oct30,	  Ir2004Dec23,	  Ir2005Dec20,	  Ir2006Dec21,	  
Ir2007Nov23,	  UK2003June24	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the	  banks’	  struggle	  for	  survival,	  for	  instance	  by	  going	  aggressively	  after	  households	  with	  
difficulties	  to	  service	  their	  mortgages,	  would	  bring	  down	  the	  economy	  and	  inflict	  
unacceptable	  social	  disruption	  on	  core	  constituencies.	  Governments	  guaranteed	  banks’	  
liabilities,	  took	  over	  their	  bad	  assets	  or	  temporarily	  nationalized	  insolvent	  financial	  
institutions.	  How	  much	  leeway	  do	  the	  two	  forms	  of	  fiscal	  monitoring	  provide	  to	  
governments	  in	  these	  testing	  times?	  	  
EU	  fiscal	  rules	  that	  guide	  surveillance	  arguably	  prioritize	  prudent	  public	  finances	  
over	  the	  stabilization	  of	  the	  economy;	  the	  accounting	  principles	  to	  generate	  the	  underlying	  
information	  are	  designed	  accordingly.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  SGP	  allows,	  in	  principle,	  to	  
exempt	  a	  country	  from	  an	  excessive	  deficit	  procedure	  if	  the	  imbalance	  is	  caused	  by	  a	  deep	  
recession.	  Although	  the	  Council	  opened	  an	  excessive	  deficit	  procedure	  against	  every	  country	  
that	  missed	  the	  three	  per	  cent	  deficit	  ratio	  during	  the	  crisis,	  no	  member	  state	  was	  fined.	  
Only	  one	  country,	  non-­‐euro	  member	  Hungary,	  came	  close	  to	  being	  fined	  when	  the	  Council	  
and	  the	  Commission	  threatened	  to	  block	  regional	  funding	  if	  the	  government	  would	  not	  
make	  more	  efforts	  to	  rein	  in	  its	  deficit9.	  In	  the	  end,	  Hungary	  did	  correct	  its	  deficit	  and	  the	  
threat	  was	  dropped	  (European	  Commission	  2012).	  	  
As	  far	  as	  bank	  rescues	  are	  concerned,	  Eurostat	  put	  out	  extensive	  communications	  
since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  to	  clarify	  the	  rules	  and	  made	  decisions	  on	  the	  treatment	  
of	  ‘financial	  defeasance	  structures’,	  as	  bad	  banks	  are	  called	  in	  official	  language.	  These	  
ensure	  that	  costs	  incurred	  and	  liabilities	  assumed	  by	  governments	  cannot	  be	  kept	  off	  the	  
books	  unless	  there	  is	  a	  very	  strong	  chance	  that	  they	  either	  will	  not	  materialize	  or	  that	  they	  
can	  be	  turned	  into	  profitable	  investment	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  most	  important	  principles	  
distinguish	  the	  various	  rescue	  measures.	  Capital	  injections	  in	  ‘too	  big	  to	  fail’	  entities	  are	  
grants	  that	  are	  deficit-­‐increasing	  (Eurostat	  2013:	  112,	  120).	  By	  contrast,	  government	  
guarantees	  of	  a	  bank’s	  liabilities,	  notably	  savings	  deposits,	  affect	  neither	  debt	  nor	  deficit	  and	  
only	  once	  the	  guarantee	  is	  called,	  does	  it	  increase	  the	  deficit	  (Eurostat	  2013:	  188,	  para	  33).	  If	  
the	  guarantee	  keeps	  a	  unit	  alive	  that	  is	  not	  really	  active	  in	  markets	  any	  more,	  Eurostat	  
(2013:	  188)	  puts	  down	  criteria	  for	  financial	  defeasance	  that	  national	  accountants	  can	  use	  to	  
establish	  whether	  it	  has	  actually	  turned	  into	  a	  vehicle	  to	  wind	  down	  some	  of	  the	  former	  
business.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  instance,	  if	  the	  guaranteed	  bank	  is	  closed	  to	  new	  deposit	  taking	  
or	  lending.	  In	  other	  words,	  only	  guarantees	  that	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  criteria	  for	  financial	  
defeasance	  are	  below	  the	  line	  of	  relevant	  fiscal	  items	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  surveillance.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  transfer	  of	  bank	  assets	  and	  liabilities	  is	  subject	  to	  asymmetric	  
valuation	  principles.	  If	  a	  bank	  or	  some	  of	  its	  assets	  and	  liabilities	  become	  part	  of	  a	  
defeasance	  structure,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  transfer	  value	  of	  the	  assets	  and	  the	  
market	  or	  fair	  value	  is	  a	  capital	  transfer	  to	  the	  debtors	  (banks)	  of	  the	  defeasance	  structure	  
that	  increases	  the	  deficit	  (Eurostat	  2013:	  183-­‐186).	  In	  a	  crisis,	  this	  difference	  and	  hence	  the	  
effect	  on	  government	  deficits	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  overstated	  because	  market	  or	  fair	  values	  tend	  
to	  be	  unduly	  low	  in	  distressed	  markets.	  Revaluation	  of	  the	  assets	  later,	  for	  instance	  due	  to	  
rising	  prices	  for	  real	  estate,	  are	  not	  taken	  into	  account	  for	  the	  net	  lending	  or	  borrowing	  of	  
the	  government	  (Eurostat	  2013:	  184,	  para	  19;	  185,	  para	  21;	  187,	  para	  30).	  The	  assets	  and	  
liabilities	  of	  a	  bad	  bank	  also	  come	  on	  the	  government	  books,	  hence	  (gross)	  debt	  of	  general	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Arguably,	  this	  might	  have	  been	  a	  sanction	  for	  other	  violations	  of	  the	  acquis	  communautaire.	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government	  increases.	  These	  accounting	  rules	  generate	  considerable	  penalty	  for	  bank	  
rescue	  measures	  in	  the	  European	  system	  of	  fiscal	  surveillance.	  
S&P’s	  approach	  creates	  even	  greater	  difficulties	  for	  governments	  in	  trying	  to	  deal	  
with	  economic	  and	  financial	  crises.	  Since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  crisis	  S&P	  has	  aggressively	  
downgraded	  previously	  high-­‐rated	  countries	  –	  like	  Ireland	  and	  Spain	  –	  for	  disappointing	  
growth	  prospects	  and	  for	  assuming	  large	  liabilities	  in	  bailing	  out	  troubled	  banks.	  The	  current	  
heavy-­‐handed	  response	  stands	  in	  marked	  contrast	  with	  the	  leniency	  exercised	  before	  the	  
crisis.	  From	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  S&P	  had	  voiced	  concerns	  about	  an	  overheating	  economy	  
(Ireland),	  excessive	  private	  sector	  indebtedness	  (Ireland	  and	  the	  UK),	  bubbles	  on	  the	  real	  
estate	  markets	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  sharp	  corrections	  (Ireland,	  Spain	  and	  the	  UK)10.	  
Although	  all	  of	  these	  factors	  foreshadowed	  problems	  with	  growth	  and	  the	  banking	  sector,	  
the	  agency	  did	  not	  consider	  a	  downgrade	  or	  even	  a	  negative	  creditwatch11	  back	  then.	  Since	  
the	  start	  of	  the	  crisis,	  however,	  rating	  methodologies	  have	  been	  updated	  to	  put	  more	  
emphasis	  on	  growth	  prospects	  and	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  banking	  sector	  and	  the	  new	  
prescriptions	  are	  enforced	  with	  unflagging	  rigor,	  without	  any	  allowance	  for	  the	  exceptional	  
circumstances.	  
S&P	  downgraded	  governments	  for	  bank	  rescues	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  they	  took	  
the	  form	  of	  guarantees,	  capital	  injections	  or	  nationalizations.	  For	  example,	  Ireland	  –	  which	  
still	  received	  a	  clean	  bill	  of	  health	  as	  late	  as	  November	  200712	  –	  was	  issued	  a	  negative	  
outlook	  in	  January	  2009	  after	  its	  government	  issued	  guarantees	  to	  seven	  national	  banks.	  It	  
was	  then	  downgraded	  six	  times	  in	  the	  following	  three	  years	  as	  the	  massive	  costs	  of	  those	  
guarantees	  materialized13.	  Importantly,	  once	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  banking	  crisis	  became	  clear,	  
S&P	  did	  not	  restrict	  itself	  to	  rate	  explicit	  government	  measures	  but	  sought	  to	  provide	  
forward-­‐looking	  evaluations	  by	  carrying	  out	  in-­‐house	  modeling	  of	  the	  further	  costs	  of	  saving	  
banks14.	  In	  none	  of	  the	  successive	  rating	  reports	  was	  there	  allowance	  for	  the	  beneficial	  
effect	  bank	  rescues	  might	  have	  for	  the	  health	  of	  the	  banking	  sector	  and	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  
longer	  term.	  Spain’s	  experience	  was	  similar.	  On	  three	  occasions,	  downgrades	  were	  
prompted	  by	  S&P’s	  progressively	  worsening	  forecasts	  of	  the	  likely	  costs	  of	  government	  
involvement	  in	  saving	  the	  banking	  sector	  (S&P	  Sp2010Apr28,	  Sp2011Dec5,	  Sp2012Apr26).	  
Efforts	  to	  restore	  a	  viable	  banking	  industry	  came	  into	  consideration	  only	  as	  a	  downside	  risk	  
for	  public	  finances.	  
In	  sum,	  the	  two	  systems	  of	  surveillance	  also	  display	  considerable	  differences.	  The	  
SGP	  has	  an	  escape	  clause	  to	  allow	  for	  suspending	  fiscal	  rules	  in	  times	  of	  recession,	  although	  
the	  Commission	  opted	  not	  to	  use	  it.	  In	  the	  handling	  of	  bank	  rescues,	  Eurostat	  aims	  at	  
maximum	  accounting	  accuracy	  and	  transparency	  by	  differentiating	  between	  the	  different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  S&P	  Ir2004Dec23,	  Ir2005Dec29,	  Ir2006Dec21,	  Ir2007Nov23,	  Sp2004Dec13,	  Sp2005Nov28,	  Sp2006Nov28,	  
Sp2007Nov26,	  UK2005Mar31,	  UK2006Nov10	  
11	  A	  negative	  creditwatch	  is	  typically	  the	  instrument	  CRAs	  used	  to	  warn	  the	  bond	  issuer	  that	  a	  downgrade	  is	  
imminent	  if	  no	  measures	  are	  taken	  (de	  Haan	  and	  Amtenbrink	  2011:	  4-­‐5).	  	  
12	  The	  2007	  November	  credit	  report	  contended	  that	  ‘Ireland's	  extremely	  strong	  [AAA]	  credit	  standing	  should	  
remain	  secure	  against	  most	  foreseeable	  downside	  economic,	  political,	  and	  financial	  risks’	  (S&P	  Ir2007Nov13:	  3).	  
13	  S&P	  Ir2009Mar30,	  Ir2009June8,	  Ir2010Aug24,	  2010Nov23,	  Ir2011Feb2,	  Ir2011Apr1	  
14	  Examples	  of	  the	  type	  of	  independent	  assessment	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  banking	  crisis	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  March	  2009	  
and	  the	  April	  2010	  rating	  reports	  on	  Ireland	  (S&P	  Ir2009Mar30:2-­‐3	  and	  Ir2010Apr8:	  2-­‐3).	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instruments	  governments	  use	  for	  bank	  rescues	  and	  by	  only	  recording	  the	  actual	  costs	  of	  a	  
transaction	  once	  financial	  defeasance	  materializes.	  By	  contrast,	  S&P	  assesses	  bank	  rescues	  
indiscriminately	  (negatively),	  and	  it	  has	  sought	  to	  adopt	  a	  proactive	  approach	  by	  penalizing	  
government	  involvement	  in	  the	  troubles	  of	  the	  banking	  sector	  even	  before	  the	  costs	  of	  
government	  intervention	  can	  be	  known	  with	  a	  reasonable	  degree	  of	  certainty.	  For	  S&P,	  
weak	  growth	  is	  a	  main	  reason	  for	  downgrading	  countries.	  	  	  
	  
Changes	  in	  Fiscal	  Monitoring	  in	  the	  Wake	  of	  the	  Crisis	  
Our	  comparison	  between	  fiscal	  surveillance	  by	  a	  deliberately	  technocratic	  body	  and	  credit	  
rating	  by	  a	  commercial	  agency	  shows	  noticeable	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  ways	  of	  fiscal	  
monitoring.	  The	  recent	  responses	  to	  the	  crisis	  by	  Eurostat,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  by	  S&P,	  on	  
the	  other,	  confirm	  and	  reinforce	  this	  finding.	  While	  Eurostat	  has	  sought	  to	  emphasize	  the	  
continuity	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  European	  System	  of	  Statistics,	  S&P	  has	  gone	  out	  of	  its	  way	  
to	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  has	  incorporated	  into	  its	  methodologies	  and	  assessments	  the	  most	  
important	  lessons	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  
Although	  Eurostat	  naturally	  had	  to	  respond	  to	  new	  issues	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  crisis,	  it	  
sought	  to	  address	  these	  issues	  emphatically	  through	  the	  continuation,	  or	  ‘clarification’,	  of	  
existing	  principles.	  For	  example,	  when	  it	  upgraded	  its	  Manual	  on	  Government	  Deficit	  and	  
Debt	  in	  2013,	  only	  one	  of	  the	  three	  new	  chapters	  related	  to	  the	  crisis.	  This	  chapter	  dealt	  
with	  new	  ‘European	  entities	  related	  to	  the	  Euro	  Area	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis’,	  i.e.	  the	  
emergency	  fund,	  the	  European	  Stability	  Mechanism	  with	  its	  predecessor	  EFSF,	  which	  
provide	  credit	  to	  governments	  under	  attack	  in	  bond	  markets.	  All	  other	  issues	  raised	  by	  the	  
crisis,	  like	  financial	  defeasance	  or	  the	  capital	  injections	  on	  an	  unprecedented	  scale	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Ireland,	  did	  not	  make	  Eurostat	  invent	  new	  accounting	  devices	  but	  issue	  
‘clarifications’.	  There	  are	  no	  significant	  changes	  to	  the	  recording	  of	  the	  other	  two	  policy	  
areas	  analyzed	  above,	  pensions	  and	  privatizations.	  	  
Eurostat	  also	  stresses	  the	  consensual	  character	  of	  its	  decisions	  concerning	  issues	  
emerging	  from	  the	  crisis.	  The	  new	  Manual	  refers	  to	  wide-­‐ranging	  consultations	  on	  the	  
clarifications	  and	  refinements	  of	  existing	  principles:	  ‘It	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  collective	  work,	  co-­‐
ordinated	  and	  animated	  by	  Eurostat,	  by	  experts	  in	  Government	  Financial	  Statistics	  and	  
national	  accounts	  representing	  EU	  Member	  States,	  the	  Commission	  (the	  Directorate	  General	  
for	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs)	  and	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank.’	  (Eurostat	  2013:	  1)	  The	  
attempt	  to	  uphold	  continuity	  and	  transparency	  in	  the	  European	  System	  of	  Statistics	  is	  based	  
on	  a	  conspicuous	  consensus	  among	  national	  and	  international	  experts,	  thus	  fending	  off	  
criticism	  and	  interventions	  by	  some	  treasuries.	  
By	  contrast,	  S&P	  has	  emphasized	  change,	  adaptation	  to	  shifting	  conditions	  and	  the	  
incorporation	  of	  new	  lessons	  into	  assessments	  of	  creditworthiness.	  Since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  
crisis,	  S&P	  issued	  three	  new	  methodologies,	  in	  2008,	  2011	  and	  2013.	  These	  successive	  
iterations	  of	  methodologies	  integrate	  new	  issues	  and	  discuss	  old	  ones	  in	  more	  detail	  than	  
before.	  All	  three	  policy	  areas	  discussed	  above	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  considerable	  revisions.	  
The	  urgency	  of	  pension	  reform	  is	  now	  explicitly	  downplayed,	  as	  already	  indicated	  (S&P	  2011:	  
26	  and	  2013:26).	  	  Privatization	  and	  structural	  reform	  also	  receive	  much	  less	  emphasis.	  
Accordingly,	  these	  issues	  literally	  disappear	  from	  individual	  country	  reports.	  Contingent	  
liabilities	  generated	  by	  an	  unstable	  banking	  sector	  are	  discussed	  in	  much	  greater	  detail	  than	  
before	  (S&P	  2011:	  28-­‐30	  and	  2013:	  28-­‐30).	  Growth	  prospects	  also	  become	  a	  central	  issue	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and	  a	  long	  section	  is	  dedicated	  to	  explaining	  how	  they	  are	  assessed	  (S&P	  2011:	  17-­‐18	  and	  
2013:17-­‐18)15.	  These	  new	  issues	  affected	  the	  ratings	  of	  a	  host	  of	  countries	  besides	  Ireland	  
and	  Spain.	  Growth	  concerns	  led	  to	  falling	  ratings	  in	  Greece,	  Italy	  and	  Portugal,	  whereas	  
problems	  with	  the	  banking	  sector	  contributed	  to	  downgrades	  of	  Belgium	  and	  potential	  
banking	  problems	  cost	  Austria	  its	  AAA	  rating16.	  	  An	  important	  new	  issue	  in	  focus	  is	  crisis	  
management	  or,	  more	  specifically,	  the	  ability	  of	  governments	  to	  respond	  to	  economic	  and	  
financial	  shocks	  (S&P	  2011:	  13	  and	  2013:13).	  Finally,	  the	  constraints	  on	  policy	  adjustment	  in	  
countries	  that	  are	  members	  of	  monetary	  unions	  are	  mentioned	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  two	  
newest	  methodologies	  (S&P	  2011:	  34-­‐35	  and	  2013:	  34-­‐35).	  The	  new	  focus	  on	  the	  latter	  two	  
issues	  motivated	  an	  unprecedented	  collective	  rating	  report	  issued	  in	  January	  2012,	  which	  
simultaneously	  reviewed	  existing	  ratings	  for	  all	  euro-­‐members	  in	  response	  to	  what	  was	  seen	  
as	  weak	  crisis	  management	  at	  the	  European	  level,	  by	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  ECB17.	  	  
The	  reforms	  in	  rating	  methodologies	  and	  profound	  changes	  in	  the	  rating	  approach	  
indicate	  that	  credit	  ratings	  do	  not	  have	  a	  consistent	  methodological	  basis	  to	  make	  them	  
usable	  for	  regulatory	  purposes.	  Instead,	  ratings	  focus	  on	  current	  issues	  that	  are	  of	  most	  
interest	  to	  market	  investors	  at	  any	  given	  moment.	  This	  explains	  both	  why	  S&P	  placed	  such	  
emphasis	  on	  privatizations	  and	  pension	  reforms	  before	  the	  crisis,	  even	  though	  these	  issues	  
have	  only	  a	  tenuous	  relationship	  to	  the	  probability	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  default,	  and	  why	  it	  was	  
so	  willing	  to	  disregard	  these	  issues	  once	  the	  crisis	  threw	  up	  others.	  This	  approach	  stands	  in	  
marked	  contrast	  with	  Eurostat’s	  insistence	  on	  maintaining	  continuity	  and	  consistency	  
despite	  the	  extraordinary	  times.	  
	  
Discussion	  and	  Conclusion	  
Our	  take	  on	  these	  findings	  is	  that	  they	  support	  neither	  the	  regulatory	  polity	  interpretation,	  
which	  sees	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  fourth	  branch	  of	  government	  for	  supranational	  economic	  regulation,	  
nor	  the	  neoliberal	  project	  view,	  which	  construes	  EU	  fiscal	  governance	  as	  an	  institutionalized	  
practice	  of	  neoliberal	  ideology.	  The	  differences	  in	  the	  approaches	  Eurostat	  and	  S&P	  charted	  
in	  the	  previous	  sections	  reveal	  that	  the	  two	  types	  of	  monitoring	  do	  not	  complement	  each	  
other	  well	  enough	  to	  allow	  either	  for	  effective	  fiscal	  discipline	  or	  to	  generate	  consistent	  
neoliberal	  pressure	  on	  policy	  making.	  
To	  start	  with	  the	  latter:	  since	  S&P	  cannot	  be	  unambiguously	  classified	  as	  truly	  
neoliberal,	  its	  interaction	  with	  Eurostat	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  persistent	  advancement	  of	  a	  
neoliberal	  policy	  agenda.	  The	  thrust	  of	  S&P’s	  rating	  is	  not	  consistent	  enough	  to	  achieve	  the	  
coherence	  of	  an	  ideology.	  Rather	  than	  dependably	  pushing	  for	  neoliberal	  policy	  choices,	  it	  is	  
transparently	  opportunistic	  in	  that	  it	  tries	  to	  speak	  to	  market	  concerns	  about	  the	  risk-­‐return	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Interestingly,	  the	  new	  methodologies	  explicitly	  promise	  to	  avoid	  the	  mistake	  that	  S&P	  committed	  when	  not	  
acting	  upon	  asset-­‐bubbles	  and	  credit	  fuelled	  growth	  in	  Spain	  and	  Ireland	  before	  the	  crisis:	  “A	  sovereign's	  
economic	  score	  would	  be	  one	  category	  worse	  than	  the	  initial	  score,	  when	  GDP	  growth	  seems	  to	  be	  fueled	  mostly	  
by	  a	  rapid	  increase	  in	  banking	  sector	  domestic	  claims	  on	  the	  private	  sector,	  combined	  with	  a	  sustained	  growth	  in	  
inflation-­‐adjusted	  asset	  prices,	  indicating	  vulnerability	  to	  a	  potential	  credit-­‐fueled	  asset	  bubble.”	  (S&P	  2011:17,	  a	  
similar	  paragraph	  can	  be	  found	  in	  S&P	  2013:16)	  
16	  S&P	  Au2012Jan13,	  Be2011Nov25,	  Gr2010Apr27,	  Gr2012May2,	  It2011Sep19,	  Pt2010Apr27	  
17	  In	  this	  collective	  rating	  action,	  nine	  sovereigns	  were	  downgraded,	  whereas	  the	  ratings	  of	  seven	  others	  were	  
affirmed	  (S&P	  2012).	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prospects	  in	  sovereign	  credit.	  The	  concern	  post-­‐crisis	  is	  low	  growth	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  adverse	  
income	  flow	  and	  debt	  stock	  dynamics	  even	  when	  the	  fiscal	  headline	  figures	  are	  improving.	  
Privatization	  of	  pensions	  and	  of	  public	  assets	  were	  put	  on	  the	  backburner	  at	  a	  time	  when	  
households	  are	  financially	  overstretched	  and	  financial	  institutions	  reluctant	  to	  invest	  in	  
illiquid	  assets.	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  CRA	  partly	  anticipates	  and	  partly	  follows	  investor	  interests	  as	  
they	  perceive	  them	  does	  not	  make	  it	  neoliberal.	  Furthermore,	  Eurostat’s	  independent	  effect	  
on	  policy	  is	  not	  unambiguously	  neoliberal	  either.	  For	  example,	  accounting	  rules	  do	  not	  give	  a	  
straightforward	  incentive	  to	  retrench	  public	  provisions	  or	  to	  privatize	  pensions.	  On	  the	  
contrary,	  Eurostat’s	  rules	  make	  public	  finances	  look	  better	  if	  the	  government	  takes	  over	  
pension	  liabilities	  from	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  into	  a	  pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go	  system	  in	  return	  for	  a	  
lump-­‐sum	  payment.	  	  
The	  regulatory	  polity	  theory	  would	  require	  that	  European	  fiscal	  surveillance	  provide	  
fiscal	  discipline	  that	  reconciles	  dependable	  rigor	  with	  the	  collective	  interests	  of	  member	  
states.	  A	  supranational	  regulator	  is	  required	  to	  solve	  this	  collective	  action	  problem,	  namely	  
not	  to	  overuse	  the	  common	  resource	  of	  a	  stable	  currency.	  If	  one	  considers	  this	  to	  be	  the	  
prime	  problem	  of	  a	  monetary	  union,	  as	  the	  architects	  of	  the	  euro	  area	  certainly	  did,	  then	  
the	  regulatory	  polity	  theory	  has	  some	  evidence	  on	  its	  side.	  S&P’s	  manifest	  failure	  to	  exert	  
consistent	  pressure	  for	  fiscal	  restraint	  on	  countries	  supports	  the	  view	  that	  enforcing	  
discipline	  cannot	  be	  left	  to	  the	  markets	  and	  a	  supranational	  public	  agency	  is	  required	  
instead.	  	  
It	  is	  debatable,	  however,	  whether	  European	  fiscal	  surveillance	  manages	  to	  further	  
collectively	  desirable	  policies	  while	  regulating	  budgets	  in	  this	  way	  as	  the	  theory	  requests.	  
Eurostat’s	  striving	  for	  stability	  of	  rules	  and	  its	  ostentatious	  reliance	  on	  international	  expert	  
consensus	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  role	  of	  a	  supranational	  regulator.	  Yet,	  being	  bound	  so	  
tightly	  by	  its	  own	  statistical	  rules	  can	  also	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  policy	  priorities	  evolving	  
during	  a	  crisis	  for	  which	  these	  rules	  were	  not	  written.	  Bank	  rescues	  are	  a	  case	  in	  point	  
(Mabbett	  and	  Schelkle	  2014:	  15-­‐22).	  Under	  Eurostat	  rules	  all	  measures	  aimed	  at	  
consolidating	  banks	  affect	  public	  finances	  negatively,	  except	  for	  guarantees.	  This	  fiscal	  
accounting	  gave	  European	  governments	  no	  incentives	  to	  pursue	  bank	  recapitalizations	  and	  
restructuring.	  The	  revealed,	  if	  contingent	  liabilities	  urge	  governments	  to	  prioritize	  budget	  
consolidation,	  not	  for	  fear	  of	  an	  EDP	  but	  for	  fear	  of	  market	  panic.	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  and	  Spain	  
were	  in	  this	  situation.	  National	  banking	  systems	  then	  survive	  mainly	  because	  the	  ECB	  throws	  
them	  a	  lifeline,	  by	  offering	  them	  very	  low	  refinancing	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  they	  earn	  higher	  
returns	  and	  recapitalize	  themselves	  out	  of	  the	  margin18.	  However,	  this	  means	  that	  Eurostat’s	  
rules	  contribute	  to	  perpetuating	  a	  regime	  that	  is	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  interest	  of	  national	  
democracies	  but	  not	  conducive	  to	  what	  is	  officially	  considered	  good	  governance	  of	  the	  
union.	  	  
The	  observed	  divergence	  between	  monitoring	  and	  responses	  to	  the	  crisis	  shows	  the	  
difficulty	  of	  a	  purely	  regulatory	  approach	  to	  fiscal	  governance.	  Without	  a	  budget	  that	  could	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  The	  number	  of	  banks	   that	  are	   thus	  kept	  alive	   is	  much	  higher	   than	   the	   indicator	  of	  defeasance	  structures	  all	  
over	  Europe	  shows.	  The	  ECB	  is	  forced	  to	  keep	  many	  banks	  on	  its	  list	  of	  monetary	  and	  financial	  institutions	  with	  
access	  to	  the	  discount	  window.	  If	  they	  were	  declared	  part	  of	  defeasance	  structures,	  the	  ECB	  could	  not	  support	  
them	  with	  its	   liquidity	  measures	  as	  this	  would	  fall	  under	  the	  prohibition	  of	  monetary	  financing	  of	  governments	  
(Mabbett	  and	  Schelkle	  2014:	  19-­‐20).	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provide	  incentives	  for	  compliance	  or	  fill	  the	  gaps	  left	  by	  member	  states,	  regulation	  by	  
supranational	  bureaucracies	  will	  be	  imperfect	  even	  if	  they	  seek	  to	  enlist	  the	  help	  of	  market	  
actors.	  The	  Commission,	  in	  the	  disguise	  of	  Eurostat,	  follows	  a	  bureaucratic	  imperative	  of	  
continuity,	  accountability	  and	  transparency,	  whereas	  monitoring	  by	  CRAs	  is	  driven	  by	  
market	  opportunism	  and	  herding	  behavior.	  Neither	  is	  fully	  justifiable	  on	  economic	  grounds,	  
especially	  not	  under	  the	  circumstances	  of	  a	  crisis.	  They	  are	  driven	  by	  institutional	  logics,	  an	  
administration,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  of	  commercial	  firms,	  on	  the	  other.	  This	  is	  not	  by	  
mistake	  but	  an	  inherent	  trait	  of	  each.	  
Rating	  agencies	  insist	  on	  their	  assessments	  being	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  
regulatory	  purposes	  and	  now	  object	  to	  the	  regulatory	  role	  ascribed	  to	  them.	  This	  view	  is	  
clearly	  expressed	  by	  the	  Chief	  Risk	  Officer	  and	  Chief	  Credit	  Officer	  at	  Moody’s:	  ‘The	  growing	  
use	  of	  ratings	  in	  regulation	  had	  given	  rise	  to	  three	  potentially	  adverse	  industry	  dynamics:	  (i)	  
the	  substitution	  of	  regulatory	  demand	  for	  investor-­‐driven	  demand	  for	  ratings,	  (ii)	  the	  
growing	  perception	  that	  ratings	  were	  something	  more	  than	  an	  opinion	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  
official	  recognition	  by	  regulators,	  and	  (iii)	  a	  vicious	  circle	  of	  intrusive	  regulation	  to	  induce	  
ratings	  and	  rating	  agencies	  to	  behave	  in	  line	  with	  regulatory	  needs,	  potentially	  changing	  the	  
nature	  of	  ratings.’	  (Cantor	  2013:	  27)	  In	  interviews,	  senior	  decision	  makers	  at	  S&P	  expressed	  
similar	  reservations	  against	  their	  regulatory	  role.	  CRAs	  define	  their	  role	  as	  service	  providers	  
to	  the	  financial	  industry,	  not	  as	  actors	  outside	  or	  beyond	  that	  industry.	  They	  stress	  that	  what	  
they	  offer	  is	  an	  opinion	  on	  creditworthiness	  meant	  to	  help	  investors	  in	  their	  own	  decision-­‐
making	  process	  rather	  than	  authoritative	  assessments	  of	  credit	  quality	  to	  be	  used	  for	  
regulatory	  purposes.	  Key	  in	  this	  distinction	  is	  the	  room	  for	  qualitative,	  subjective	  assessment	  
that	  is	  recognized	  as	  such.	  	  
This	  emphasis	  on	  ‘opinions	  about	  creditworthiness’	  might	  be	  self-­‐serving,	  namely	  to	  
limit	  legal	  liability	  and	  defending	  their	  autonomy,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  an	  insight	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  
heeded	  by	  those	  who	  hope	  that	  a	  tightened	  fiscal	  surveillance	  regime	  and	  new	  rules	  for	  
sovereign	  credit	  rating	  can	  do	  the	  trick	  for	  EU	  fiscal	  governance.	  New	  regulation	  on	  the	  
rating	  business	  came	  into	  force	  on	  June	  20,	  2013,	  seeking	  to	  make	  it	  more	  transparent,	  
more	  predictable	  and	  more	  accountable19.	  However,	  such	  rules	  have	  little	  chance	  of	  
transforming	  CRA	  activities	  as	  desired	  by	  the	  regulator	  if	  CRAs	  and	  the	  regulator	  disagree	  
about	  what	  rating	  agencies	  do.	  	  
Market	  discipline,	  even	  if	  it	  reliably	  existed,	  is	  not	  a	  natural	  ally	  of	  prudent	  
regulation.	  When	  markets	  become	  a	  binding	  constraint	  on	  government	  finances,	  they	  
usually	  trigger	  a	  crisis	  that,	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  nobody	  is	  prepared	  to	  simply	  let	  run	  its	  
course.	  The	  EU	  approach	  of	  regulating	  governments	  into	  ever	  more	  transparency	  and	  
accountability	  is	  prone	  to	  distort	  the	  lessons	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  any	  of	  these	  financial	  crises.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  The	  new	  rules	  mandate	  CRAs	  to	  set	  up	  a	  calendar	  indicating	  when	  they	  will	  rate	  Member	  States	  and	  to	  rate	  
sovereigns	  at	  least	  every	  six	  months,	  but	  not	  more	  often	  than	  three	  times	  a	  year.	  They	  also	  stipulate	  that	  rating	  
changes	  may	  only	  be	  announced	  on	  Fridays	  after	  close	  of	  business	  to	  allow	  governments	  to	  react	  to	  the	  news	  
before	  markets	  can	  move.	  They	  require	  CRAs	  to	  make	  their	  methodologies	  public	  and	  invite	  comments	  from	  
stakeholders.	  They	  also	  demand	  that	  CRAs	  disclose	  the	  assumptions	  that	  their	  assessment	  is	  based	  on.	  They	  seek	  
to	  create	  greater	  accountability	  by	  making	  CRAs	  liable	  for	  errors	  caused	  by	  ‘gross	  negligence’.	  	  (see:	  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_IP-­‐13-­‐555_en.htm?xrs=RebelMouse_tw	  accessed	  on	  December	  29,	  2014).	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It	  always	  starts	  and	  ends	  with	  holding	  governments	  accountable,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  
sovereign	  debt	  is	  the	  cause	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
This	  is	  risky	  and	  potentially	  self-­‐defeating.	  If	  private	  debt	  and	  credit,	  accumulated	  
through	  current	  account	  imbalances	  and	  household	  finances,	  leads	  into	  a	  balance	  sheet	  
recession,	  then	  sequencing	  of	  private	  and	  public	  deleveraging	  is	  required	  (Bornhorst	  and	  
Ruiz-­‐Arranz	  2013).	  Yet,	  Eurostat’s	  understandable	  attempt	  to	  be	  consistent	  is	  maximally	  
unfavorable	  to	  sovereigns.	  These	  biases	  contribute	  to	  the	  fragility	  of	  the	  euro	  area	  (De	  
Grauwe	  2011).	  Other	  institutions	  of	  the	  EU,	  notably	  the	  emergency	  fund	  ESM	  and	  the	  ECB,	  
then	  have	  to	  compensate	  for	  these	  biases,	  created	  by	  an	  unholy	  alliance	  of	  commercial	  and	  
technocratic	  monitoring	  of	  sovereign	  debt.	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